An Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperation Mode of the NEV Power Battery Recycling and Gradient Utilization Alliance in the Context of China's NEV Power Battery Retired Tide

被引:16
|
作者
Lyu, Xichen [1 ]
Xu, Yingying [1 ]
Sun, Dian [2 ]
机构
[1] Harbin Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Harbin 150040, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
NEV battery recycling; gradient utilization; cooperation mode; evolutionary game; LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT; LEAD-ACID-BATTERIES; ELECTRIC VEHICLE PRODUCTION; LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES; GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY; STRATEGY; IMPACT; TECHNOLOGY; SIMULATION; CHALLENGES;
D O I
10.3390/su13084165
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China's NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the "win-win" cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect.
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页数:27
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