Analysis of Government Procurement Based on Principal-agent Theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Tang Shi-qian [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (6TH), VOL III | 2010年
关键词：
Government procurement; Principal-agent; Rent-seeking; Tripartite decision-making model;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要：
Due to the asymmetric information phenomenon, the purchasing agencies of government procurement always have problems of rent-seeking to circumvent bidding and fraud issues. These issues lead to low efficiency of some local government procurement agencies. Start with the optimum efficiency of the minimum purchase amount of information, the dissertation provides constructive solutions through principal-agent theory and tripartite decision-making model: eliminated unless administrative monopoly, improved the system of principal-agent, to meet the purpose of reducing rent-seeking and restraining the corrupt behavior.
引用
收藏
页码：351 / 356
页数：6
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