Toward a theory of solidarity (Other-regarding acts and beliefs)

Many types of 'other-regarding' acts and beliefs cannot be accounted for satisfactorily as instances of sophisticated selfishness, altruism, team-reasoning. Kantian duty, kin selection etc. This paper argues in favour of re-inventing the notion fo solidarity as an analytical category capable of shedding important new light on hitherto under-explained aspects of human motivation. Unlike altruism and natural sympathy (which turn the interests of specific others into one's own), or team-reasoning (which applies exclusively to members of some team), or Kantian duty (which demands universalisable principles of action) the essence of solidarity lies int he hypothesis that people are capable of responding sympathetically to (or empathising with) a condition afflicting 'others', irrespectively of who those others are or whether one cares for them personally. And when that condition si a social artefact, we argue, solidarity turns radical.