Extending Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes delegating lawmaking power to the president

This Note argues that courts should extend Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes delegating lawmaking to the President. By examining one such instance-the amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act authorizing execution of blocked assets of terrorist states and President Clinton's interpretation of this amendment's ambiguous waiver provision-this Note shows that the rationales of Chevron-delegation, democratic accountability, and expertise-would all be served by deferring to the President's interpretation. The ambiguity of the waiver provision suggests that Congress could not resolve the issue of the waiver's scope. In light of Chevron, this suggests that Congress left the resolution of the issue to the body it best saw fit to do so-the President. Furthermore, extending Chevron's presumption of implicit delegation to ambiguities within statutes to be implemented by the President would be superior to the case-by-case interpretation of ambiguities presently offered by courts. Congress will be aware of and enjoy the benefits associated with the presumption of implied delegation to the President, as it does with the presumption of implied delegation to the agencies. Next, because the President is more democratically accountable than the courts, and indeed even more than the agencies, the second rationale of Chevron, that of democratic accountability, would also be further sewed by extending judicial deference to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes. Finally, the third rationale of Chevron, that of expertise, would be served by extending Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of ambiguities in foreign affairs and national security statutes because these statutes fall into the President's area of expertise. Therefore, courts would further the rationales of the Chevron doctrine by extending Chevron deference to presidential interpretations of statutes involving national security and foreign affairs.