Afghanistan, Iraq and the Development of US Military Power

被引:0
|
作者
Ulriksen, Stale [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] FHS Sjokrigsskolen, Lillehammer, Norway
[2] NUPI, Oslo, Norway
关键词
Afghanistan; cost of war; counterinsurgency; Iraq; military power; US armed forces;
D O I
10.23865/intpol.v80.3912
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
The United States had no doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started in 2001 and 2003, respectively. In 2001 the US armed forces were designed for Great Power competition and conflict. During the course of the wars, substantial changes were made in the organization and equipment of the forces, and a COIN doctrine was introduced in 2007. In turn, large scale modernization of, and investments in, equipment suited for Great Power conflict were reduced in scale or cancelled. The cost of the wars and the changes in operational focus have blunted the US's ability to compete militarily with China and Russia.
引用
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页码:312 / 322
页数:11
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