David Lewis's humean theory of objective chance

被引:72
|
作者
Loewer, B [1 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Philosophy, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/428015
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual "interpretations of probability" give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance" he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.
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页码:1115 / 1125
页数:11
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