Separated interactive behaviors promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引:5
|
作者
Mao, Deming [1 ]
Li, Xiaoyu [1 ]
Mu, Dejun [1 ]
Liu, Dujuan [3 ]
Chu, Chen [2 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Cybersecur, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Ctr Opt IMagery Anal & Learning OPTIMAL, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[3] Xian Aeronaut Polytech Inst, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[4] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Kunming 650221, Yunnan, Peoples R China
来源
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL B | 2021年 / 94卷 / 07期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
EVOLUTION; COEVOLUTION; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00118-7
中图分类号
O469 [凝聚态物理学];
学科分类号
070205 ;
摘要
Interactive diversity and interactive identity are two common behavioral patterns. Interactive identity, where each individual takes identity behavior to all its neighbors, and interactive diversity, where each individual takes diversity behaviors to its different neighbors. However, most previous researches mainly focused on study these two behaviors separately. So how the cooperation dynamics will perform when two behaviors are mixed in population still needs a reasonable explanation. In this paper, we study the cooperation evolution process when players take interactive diversity and identity are mixed in population. This model is applied for prisoner dilemma game on square lattice. When studying mixed population including both interactive in various proportions we find out the damage of cooperation. On the contrary, when player taking interactive diversity or players taking interactive identity exist alone in the population cooperation will be improved. To figure out the internal dynamic, we plot different kinds of strategy pair evolution process and the distribution of strategy and player when different proportion. The results of our study reveal that for only players taking interactive diversity or identity, defectors form distinct shape of clusters, while when two typed players are mixed distribute in network, defectors will form large and connected clusters, which is the crucial to maintain existence of defectors.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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