The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

被引：13
|
作者：
Lehtinen, Aki [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Helsinki, Dept Social & Moral Philosophy, FIN-00014 Helsinki, Finland
来源：
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2008年 / 24卷 / 03期
基金：
芬兰科学院;
关键词：
strategic voting; strategic behaviour; plurality rule; approval rule; simulation;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.03.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Under approval voting utilitarian efficiency is relatively high irrespective of the behavioural assumption, and under the plurality rule strategic voting significantly increases utilitarian efficiency. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：688 / 704
页数：17
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