ZebRAM: Comprehensive and Compatible Software Protection Against Rowhammer Attacks

被引:0
|
作者
Konoth, Radhesh Krishnan [1 ]
Oliverio, Marco [1 ,2 ]
Tatar, Andrei [1 ]
Andriesse, Dennis [1 ]
Bos, Herbert [1 ]
Giuffrida, Cristiano [1 ]
Razavi, Kaveh [1 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Calabria, Calabria, Italy
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH USENIX SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION | 2018年
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The Rowhammer vulnerability common to many modern DRAM chips allows attackers to trigger bit flips in a row of memory cells by accessing the adjacent rows at high frequencies. As a result, they are able to corrupt sensitive data structures (such as page tables, cryptographic keys, object pointers, or even instructions in a program), and circumvent all existing defenses. This paper introduces ZebRAM, a novel and comprehensive software-level protection against Rowhammer. ZebRAM isolates every DRAM row that contains data with guard rows that absorb any Rowhammer-induced bit flips; the only known method to protect against all forms of Rowhammer. Rather than leaving guard rows unused, ZebRAM improves performance by using the guard rows as efficient, integrity-checked and optionally compressed swap space. ZebRAM requires no hardware modifications and builds on virtualization extensions in commodity processors to transparently control data placement in DRAM. Our evaluation shows that ZebRAM provides strong security guarantees while utilizing all available memory.
引用
收藏
页码:697 / 710
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] ANVIL: Software-Based Protection Against Next-Generation Rowhammer Attacks
    Aweke, Zelalem Birhanu
    Yitbarek, Salessawi Ferede
    Qiao, Rui
    Das, Reetuparna
    Hicks, Matthew
    Oren, Yossi
    Austin, Todd
    ACM SIGPLAN NOTICES, 2016, 51 (04) : 743 - 755
  • [2] Securing SoCs With FPGAs Against Rowhammer Attacks
    Elnaggar, Rana
    Chen, Siyuan
    Song, Peilin
    Chakrabarty, Krishnendu
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, 2022, 41 (07) : 2052 - 2065
  • [3] Detection Technique of Software-Induced Rowhammer Attacks
    Lee, Minkyung
    Kwak, Jin
    CMC-COMPUTERS MATERIALS & CONTINUA, 2021, 67 (01): : 349 - 367
  • [4] Comprehensive Analysis of Software Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks
    Theissing, Nikolaus
    Merli, Dominik
    Smola, Michael
    Stumpf, Frederic
    Sigl, Georg
    DESIGN, AUTOMATION & TEST IN EUROPE, 2013, : 404 - 409
  • [5] CAn't Touch This: Software-only Mitigation against Rowhammer Attacks targeting Kernel Memory
    Brasserl, Ferdinand
    Davie, Lucas
    Gens, David
    Liebchen, Christopher
    Sadeghil, Ahmad-Reza
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (USENIX SECURITY '17), 2017, : 117 - 130
  • [6] Protection of software against various attacks: issues and challenges
    Anshika Sharma
    Palak Khurana
    Shailendra Narayan Singh
    CSI Transactions on ICT, 2016, 4 (2-4) : 271 - 278
  • [7] Mars Attacks! Software Protection Against Space Radiation
    Wang, Haoda
    Myint, Steven
    Verma, Vandi
    Winetraub, Yonatan
    Yang, Junfeng
    Cidon, Asaf
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS IN NETWORKS, HOTNETS 2023, 2023, : 245 - 253
  • [8] SoftTRR: Protect Page Tables against Rowhammer Attacks using Software-only Target Row Refresh
    Zhang, Zhi
    Cheng, Yueqiang
    Wang, Minghua
    He, Wei
    Wang, Wenhao
    Nepal, Surya
    Gao, Yansong
    Li, Kang
    Wang, Zhe
    Wu, Chenggang
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2022 USENIX ANNUAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE, 2022, : 399 - 414
  • [9] Integration of Software Protection Mechanisms against Reverse Engineering Attacks
    Lee, Jinyoung
    Chang, Hyeyoung
    Cho, Seong-Je
    Kim, Seong Baeg
    Park, Yongsu
    Choi, WoongChul
    INFORMATION-AN INTERNATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, 2012, 15 (04): : 1569 - 1578
  • [10] Protection Against Hardware Trojan Attacks: Towards a Comprehensive Solution
    Bhunia, Swarup
    Abramovici, Miron
    Agrawal, Dakshi
    Bradley, Paul
    Hsiao, Michael S.
    Plusquellic, Jim
    Tehranipoor, Mohammad
    IEEE DESIGN & TEST, 2013, 30 (03) : 6 - 17