How do inference rules for causal learning themselves change developmentally? A model of the development of causal reasoning must address this question, as well as specify the inference rules. Here, the evidence for developmental changes in processes of causal reasoning is reviewed, with the distinction made between diagnostic causal inference and causal prediction. Also addressed is the paradox of a causal reasoning literature that highlights the competencies of young children and the proneness to error among adults. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:327335. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1160
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Philosophy, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Free Univ Berlin, Inst Philosophie, Berlin, Germany
Ctr Adv Study Humanities Human Abil, Berlin, GermanyStanford Univ, Dept Philosophy, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Goddu, Mariel K.
Gopnik, Alison
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机构:
Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Psychol, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Philosophy Affiliate, Berkeley, CA 94720 USAStanford Univ, Dept Philosophy, Stanford, CA 94305 USA