Circumventing Legislative Committees: The US Senate

被引:6
|
作者
Howard, Nicholas O. [1 ]
Owens, Mark E. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Auburn Univ, Polit Sci, POB 244023, Montgomery, AL 36124 USA
[2] Univ Texas Tyler, Polit Sci, CAS 114,3900 Univ Blvd, Tyler, TX 75799 USA
[3] Univ Texas Tyler, Ctr Opin Res, CAS 114,3900 Univ Blvd, Tyler, TX 75799 USA
关键词
Senate; agenda setting; minority party; committees; UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENTS; AGENDA CONTROL; HOUSE; PETITIONS; PARTIES; MOTIONS; RIGHTS; FLOOR;
D O I
10.1111/lsq.12269
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Committees have been established to improve legislation and make expert recommendations. However, many bills do not appear in committees, and how they reach the Senate floor varies in style and strategy. We develop and test expectations for when, as well as how, bills bypass Senate committee proceedings. The procedures legislators use to circumvent committees and what makes committee bypassing more probable are explored. The findings clearly demonstrate that bills introduced by ideologically extreme minority-party members are more likely to bypass committees. We also show a clear shift in the procedural choices senators make as the Senate becomes increasingly polarized. This article highlights the procedural choices members make, how these choices produce differing outcomes, and suggests evidence of positive agenda power for individual minority-party senators.
引用
收藏
页码:495 / 526
页数:32
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