SKORUPSKI ON SPONTANEITY, APRIORITY AND NORMATIVE TRUTH

This paper raises a dilemma for Skorupski's meta-normative outlook in The Domain of Reasons and explores some escape routes, recommending a more thoroughgoing Kantianism as the best option. Section 1 argues that we cannot plausibly combine Skorupski's spontaneity-based epistemology of normativity with his cognition-independent view of normative truth. Sections 2-4 consider whether we should keep the epistemology and revise the metaphysics, opting for constructivism. While Skorupski's negative case for his spontaneity-based epistemology is found wanting, it is suggested that a better argument for keeping the epistemology and switching to Kantian constructivism can be given from a thesis he finds appealing-viz., 'cognitive internalism'. While this thesis is not, it is argued, obviously true, the view it supports does provide a good way to undergird Skorupski's most interesting rationale for his reasons-first approach.