Solving a hold-up problem may harm all firms: Downstream R&D and transport-price contracts

被引：3

作者：

Takauchi, Kazuhiro ^{[1
]}

Mizuno, Tomomichi ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Kansai Univ, Fac Business & Commerce, 3-3-35 Yamate Cho, Suita, Osaka 5648680, Japan

[2] Kobe Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Nada Ku, 2-1 Rokkodai Cho, Kobe, Hyogo 6578501, Japan

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2019年 / 59卷

关键词：

Transport-price contracts; Downstream R&D; Firm-specific Carrier; Hold-up problem; RAISING RIVALS COSTS; TRADE LIBERALIZATION; INNOVATION; COMPETITION; COMMITMENT; REDUCTION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.iref.2018.08.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study considers transport-price contracts in a two-country duopoly model with firm-specific carriers. It is well-known that when an upstream firm fails to commit to keeping its transaction (or transport) price after a downstream firm's R&D investment, it causes the hold-up problem and diminishes the incentive for R&D investment. While previous literature emphasizes that the commitment to keep the transaction price is needed to overcome the hold-up problem, we show that this commitment may harm all firms. We also discuss the robustness of our results in cases with R&D spillovers, product differentiation, and non-linear production costs.

引用

页码：29 / 49

页数：21