Optimally sticky prices: Foundations

被引：0
|
作者：
L'huillier, Jean-Paul [1 ]
Zame, William R. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Brandeis Univ, Dept Econ, Waltham, MA 02453 USA
[2] UCLA, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2022年 / 141卷
关键词：
Sticky prices; Frictions; Pricing policies; Optimal mechanisms; BUSINESS; MONEY; INFORMATION; DYNAMICS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104397
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We propose a strategic microfoundation for sticky prices. We model an environment in which a firm has better information than its consumers and show that, when many consumers are uninformed, it is optimal for the firm to offer sticky contracts or sticky prices. We establish this result in a general mechanism design framework that allows for nonlinear pricing and screening. A virtue of our microfoundation is that it is compatible with a dynamic general equilibrium model. We then discuss the implications of this microfounded friction for welfare. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：21
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