Monopolization by ''raising rivals' costs'': The Standard Oil case

被引:62
|
作者
Granitz, E [1 ]
Klein, B [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA
来源
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 1996年 / 39卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.1086/467342
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Standard monopolized the petroleum industry during the 1870s by cartelizing the stage of production where entry was difficult-petroleum transportation. Standard enforced the transportation cartel by shifting its refinery shipments among railroads to stabilize individual railroad market shares at collusively agreed-on levels. This method of cartel policing was effective because Standard possessed a dominant share of refining, a dominance made possible with the assistance of the railroads. The railroads facilitated Standard's refinery acquisitions and prevented new refiner entry by charging disadvantageously high rates to non-Standard refiners. While Standard used its dominant position in refining to sell refined product at a monopoly price and to purchase crude oil at a monopsony price, Standard did not possess independent market power in refining. Whenever the transportation cartel broke down, Standard's pricing power vanished.
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页码:1 / 47
页数:47
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