Does Private Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13

被引:45
|
作者
Joshi, Preetika [1 ]
机构
[1] McGill Univ, Desautels Fac Management, 1001 Sherbrooke St W, Montreal, PQ H3A 1G5, Canada
关键词
tax transparency; private tax disclosure regulations; corporate taxation; tax avoidance; income shifting; reputation cost; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; MULTINATIONALS;
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.12304
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
To combat tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCr), requiring firms to provide tax authorities with a geographic breakdown of their profitability and activities. Treating the introduction of CbCr in the European Union as a shock to private disclosure requirements, this study examines the effect on corporate tax outcomes. Exploiting the euro750 million revenue threshold for disclosure and employing regression-discontinuity and difference-in-differences designs, I document a 1-2 percentage point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. I also find evidence consistent with a decline in tax-motivated income shifting, starting in 2018. These results suggest that, although private geographic disclosures can deter corporate tax avoidance, so far, the regulations have had a limited effect on tax-motivated income shifting. My findings have policy implications for the global implementation of private CbCr and extend the debate on public versus private disclosure of tax information.
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页码:333 / 381
页数:49
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