Food sharing among retaliators: sequential arrivals and information asymmetries

Many animals share food, that is, to tolerate competitors at a defensible clump. Most accounts of resource sharing invoke special evolutionary processes or ecological circumstances that reduce their generality. Surprisingly, the Hawk-Dove game has been unable to address in a simple and general way why so many group foraging animals share food. We modify the Hawk-Dove game by allowing a finder the opportunity of retaliating if joiners escalate and by considering the consequences of information asymmetries concerning resource value among players. Introducing the first change, the retaliator strategy was sufficient to predict widespread sharing in habitats where food clumps are of intermediate richness. When information asymmetry between finder and joiner is created by allowing the quality of clumps to vary, we show that the conditions for sharing are even more easily met and apply to a wider range of resource qualities. Our model therefore offers one of the most parsimonious and potentially general evolutionary accounts of the origin of non-aggressive resource sharing.