Following the law because it's the law: obedience, bootstrapping, and practical reason

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent's following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it's the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort - that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something's being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn't taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason - in particular, it's due to the belief that it's impossible for reasons to be bootstrapped into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there's no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person's being justified in following the law because it's the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.