IN DEFENSE OF BRAIN MAPPING IN SOCIAL AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE

The primary question asked for this special issue concerns how neuroscience data might contribute to and generate new theories in social psychology. Interestingly, in attempts to address this question, social neuroscientists have rushed to make sometimes overly bold claims about their data to demonstrate the utility of social neuroscience. The implicit logic in this response is a fear that to be useful, social neuroscience data needs quickly to move beyond brain mapping-the localization of specific social processes such as morality, the self, attitude, or prejudice to a particular brain region-and contribute in a more meaningful way. The promise of social neuroscience has always been to link multiple levels of analysis, constrain interpretation across these levels, and derive new predictions; yet there is now some question as to whether the field can deliver on this promise. Although this is an important question to ask, I suggest that requiring specific answers to this concern may be counterproductive at this stage of the field and that shifting the focus from brain mapping to process inference may be too early. Reverse inferences from the brain to social theory need to be based on accurate models of brain function and to the extent there are errors in our understanding of observed brain activation patterns our inferences will be necessarily invalid. What is required in social neuroscience research is an iterative cycle of brain mapping with one goal to understand how social and affective processes are computed in the brain, and with each iteration a second goal to determine whether (a) current social psychological models can account for these data, and (b) if not, to derive new theories. Thus, brain mapping as a research goal cannot be maligned, as it is a critical element of the social neuroscience enterprise. Indeed, at this stage of this newly emerging field, brain mapping should perhaps even be our dominant focus.