FINANCIAL CONTRACTING UNDER IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT

被引：18
|
作者：
Ellingsen, Tore [1 ,2 ]
Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard [2 ]
机构：
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Oslo, Norway
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 126卷 / 01期
关键词：
OPTIMAL SECURITY DESIGN; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR PROTECTION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; CONTINUOUS-TIME; EQUITY; DEBT; LAW; INTERMEDIATION;
D O I：
10.1093/qje/qjq006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop a model of financial contracting under imperfect enforcement. Financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns, but enforcement is probabilistic and penalties are limited. The model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock, and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities. JEL Codes: G32.
引用
收藏
页码：323 / 371
页数：49
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
    Drozd, Lukasz A.
    Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2018, 178 : 153 - 189
  • [2] Contracting for information under imperfect commitment
    Krishna, Vijay
    Morgan, John
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2008, 39 (04): : 905 - 925
  • [3] A Variational Approach to Contracting under Imperfect Observations
    Capponi, Agostino
    Cvitanic, Jaksa
    Yolcu, Turkay
    [J]. SIAM JOURNAL ON FINANCIAL MATHEMATICS, 2012, 3 (01): : 605 - 638
  • [4] Financial contracting and misreporting with limited enforcement, firm financing and growth
    Adama, Adams Sorekuong Yakubu
    [J]. COGENT ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2020, 8 (01):
  • [5] The collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement
    Beutler, Toni
    Grobety, Mathieu
    [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2019, 111 : 336 - 359
  • [6] Economics of export subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement
    Giannakas, K
    [J]. AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS, 2003, 47 (04) : 541 - 562
  • [7] On the redistributive impact of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement
    Ambec, Stefan
    Hotte, Louis
    [J]. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2006, 11 : 677 - 696
  • [8] Conglomerate entrenchment under optimal financial contracting
    Faure-Grimaud, A
    Inderst, R
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (03): : 850 - 861
  • [9] Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
    Giat, Yahel
    Subramanian, Ajay
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 2013, 37 (12): : 2833 - 2861
  • [10] Group contracting and enforcement
    Laffont, JJ
    N'Guessan, T
    [J]. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 2001, 157 (04): : 487 - 498
12345