An elliptic curve based authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless security

When we consider wireless security, it is strongly preferable to use password-based authentication and the elliptic curve based Diffie-Hellman protocol since the former provides a user-friendly authentication method and the latter is an efficient key agreement protocol. However, this combination does riot necessarily guarantee security against off-line dictionary attacks (especially, "partition attacks"). In this paper, we propose an elliptic curve based authenticated key agreement (called EC-AKA) protocol that is secure against partition attacks as well as suitable for the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with many different servers, remembers only one password and has insecure devices; (2) the counterpart servers are riot perfectly secure against several attacks; (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper Resistance Modules) is available. The EC-AKA protocol is secure under the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. We also show that; the EC-AKA protocol achieves more strengthened security properties and efficiency compared with the existing protocols (employed in the IEEE 802.1x).