Beyond Independence: CEO Influence and the Internal Operations of the Board

被引：3
|
作者：
Horstmeyer, Derek [1 ]
机构：
[1] George Mason Univ, Sch Business, 4400 Univ Dr, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2019年 / 9卷 / 02期
关键词：
Corporate governance; boards of directors; Sarbanes-Oxley; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DETERMINANTS; SIZE; COMMITTEE; DIRECTORS;
D O I：
10.1142/S201013921950006X
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Using a detailed dataset on the meeting sub-structure of the board, this paper investigates the time trends and cross-sectional determinants of internal boardroom control. First, I document that the principal governance reform following Sarbanes-Oxley was the removal of the CEO as a participating member in board monitoring and investment decisions. Consistent with this being against the preferences of the average CEO, I find that CEO power is negatively related to monitoring work handled outside of the CEO's presence and positively related to board-time spent in the executive committee. Together the results highlight internal operations as governance concerns of the modern board.
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页数：40
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