The growth of Euro-scepticism in the last decade and a half would seem to suggest a decline in public consensus on the European Union (EU) - that is, a decline in the congruence of individual's attitudes. Yet, Euro-scepticism may simply reflect movement of the distribution in the issue space, as opposed to a change in the shape of the distribution. The difference between these perspectives is important because while a shift in the distribution has implications for the EU, a change in the shape of the distribution has implications for both the EU and domestic politics. To address the issue, we examine cross-temporal variation in the mean, variance and kurtosis of public opinion distribution on the EU - that is, the shape of the distribution. Unsurprisingly, opinions are more dispersed and the distributions flatter in the 1990s, relative to the 1980s. Yet, when viewed over the long run the extent of the decline in consensus is far less marked. Indeed, we find cross-national convergence in opinion in the last three decades, and, evidence of greater attitudinal polarization in the 1970s than in the early years of the new millennium.