Actual versus Perceived Taylor Rules: How Predictable Is the European Central Bank?

被引:0
|
作者
Markov, Nikolay [1 ]
机构
[1] Pictet Asset Management, CH-1211 Geneva 73, Switzerland
关键词
European Central Bank; monetary policy predictability; policy reaction function; real-time forecasts; financial crisis; MONETARY-POLICY RULES; REAL-TIME DATA; OUTPUT-GAP; TRANSPARENCY; CREDIBILITY;
D O I
10.1108/S1571-038620150000024019
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This chapter investigates the predictability of the European monetary policy through the eyes of the professional forecasters from a large investment bank. The analysis is based on forward-looking Actual and Perceived Taylor Rules for the European Central Bank which are estimated in real-time using a newly constructed database for the period April 2000-November 2009. The former policy rule is based on the actual refirate set by the Governing Council, while the latter is estimated for the bank's economists using their main point forecast for the upcoming refi rate decision as a dependent variable. The empirical evidence shows that the pattern of the refi rate is broadly well predicted by the professional forecasters even though the latter have foreseen more accurately the increases rather than the policy rate cuts. Second, the results point to an increasing responsiveness of the ECB to macroeconomic fundamentals along the forecast horizon. Third, the rolling window regressions suggest that the estimated coefficients have changed after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in October 2008; the ECB has responded less strongly to macroeconomic fundamentals and the degree of policy inertia has decreased. A sensitivity analysis shows that the baseline results are robust to applying a recursive window methodology and some of the findings are qualitatively unaltered from using Consensus Economics forecasts in the regressions.
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收藏
页码:195 / 266
页数:72
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