Leakage from Sub-national Climate Policy: The Case of California's Cap-and-Trade Program

被引:41
|
作者
Caron, Justin [1 ]
Rausch, Sebastian [1 ,2 ]
Winchester, Niven [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Joint Program Sci & Policy Global Change, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Dept Management Technol & Econ, Zurich, Switzerland
来源
ENERGY JOURNAL | 2015年 / 36卷 / 02期
关键词
Climate policy; Cap-and-trade; California; Electricity imports; Resource shuffling; Computable general equilibrium; State-level climate policy; Border effect; STATE;
D O I
10.5547/01956574.36.2.8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
With federal policies to curb carbon emissions stagnating in the U.S., California is taking action alone. Sub-national policies can lead to high rates of emissions leakage to other regions as state-level economies are closely connected, including integration of electricity markets. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we estimate that California's cap-and-trade program without restrictions on imported electricity increases out-of-state emissions by 45% of the domestic reduction. When imported electricity is included in the cap and "resource shuffling" is banned, as set out in California's legislation, emissions reductions in electricity exporting states partially offset leakage elsewhere and overall leakage is 9%.
引用
收藏
页码:167 / 190
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条