The Dark Side of Executive Compensation Duration: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions

被引:11
|
作者
Li, Zhi [1 ]
Peng, Qiyuan [2 ]
机构
[1] Chapman Univ, Argyros Sch Business & Econ, Orange, CA 92866 USA
[2] Univ Dayton, Sch Business Adm, Dayton, OH 45469 USA
关键词
PROPENSITY SCORE; SAMPLE SELECTION; EMPIRICAL POWER; HORIZON PROBLEM; STOCK RETURNS; INCENTIVES; SPECIFICATION; PERFORMANCE; UNCERTAINTY; DEBT;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109020000812
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that contrary to popular belief, CEOs with long compensation duration do not make better long-term investment decisions. Using a comprehensive pay duration measure, we find that acquisitions conducted by CEOs with long compensation duration receive more negative announcement returns, and experience significantly worse post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance, compared with deals conducted by CEOs with short compensation duration. The negative correlation between compensation duration and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance is driven by long-term time-vesting plans, not by performance-vesting plans. The results suggest that extending CEO pay horizons without implementing performance requirements is insufficient to improve managerial long-term investment decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:2963 / 2997
页数:35
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