Using Artificial Intelligence to Identify Strategic Mortgage Default Attitudes

被引:1
|
作者
Anderson, Jackson T. [1 ]
Freybote, Julia [2 ]
Lucus, David [3 ]
Seiler, Michael J. [4 ]
Simon, Lauren [5 ]
机构
[1] Claremont Mckenna Coll, Dept Econ, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
[2] Portland State Univ, Sch Business, Portland, OR 97207 USA
[3] Texas Tech Univ, Rawls Coll Business, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
[4] Coll William & Mary, Raymond A Mason Sch Business, Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA
[5] Univ Arkansas, Sam M Walton Coll Business, Fayetteville, AR 72701 USA
关键词
Residential mortgages; strategic default; borrower characteristics; artificial intelligence; emotion recognition; AMAZONS MECHANICAL TURK; DECISION;
D O I
10.1080/08965803.2021.2009621
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Previous studies have yielded ambiguous results regarding the impact of income and financial experience on the decision of residential borrowers to strategically default. One explanation for these findings is the presence of an interaction effect between income and financial experience, which was ignored in earlier studies. We hypothesize that borrowers with a greater ability to assess the financial benefits of strategic default, due to a higher financial experience, and overcome the financial consequences of it, due to higher incomes, have fewer negative attitudes towards strategic default. We capture negative attitudes of US homeowners (borrowers) by measuring their anger towards residential borrowers who decided to strategically default. In particular, we (1) ask them to self-report their anger and (2) measure their anger with artificial intelligence (AI)-based emotion recognition software. We find evidence for the hypothesized interaction effect: Borrowers with higher incomes and greater financial experience, particularly regarding value of money, savings, and investments, have fewer negative attitudes towards strategic default. Our results have implications for mortgage lenders. While borrowers with higher incomes and more financial experience are likely to have a lower economic default risk, their strategic default risk may be higher.
引用
收藏
页码:429 / 445
页数:17
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