ARE CEOS REPLACED FOR POOR PERFORMANCE? EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS AND GOVERNANCE ON CEO TURNOVER

被引：2
|
作者：
HomRoy, Swarnodeep [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lancaster, Lancaster LA1 4YW, England
来源：
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2015年 / 62卷 / 02期
关键词：
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGEMENT; MODELS; PAY; ACQUISITIONS; DIRECTORS;
D O I：
10.1111/sjpe.12068
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article analyzes the risk of CEO turnover in US firms over the period 1993-2011. There is an increase in the CEO turnover rate and a 41% decline in median tenure. Where firm performance is poor, CEOs are increasingly replaced, either by the board or in the process of the firm being taken over. US corporate governance regulations had some success in mitigating the agency problem. In the wake of those reforms, CEO turnover outcomes are more strongly associated with firm performance. The declining CEO tenure may have structural impacts on CEO pay.
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页码：149 / 170
页数：22
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