On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Goods

We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and equitability up to one good (EQ1) in conjunction with Pareto-optimality (PO). There exists a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute an EF1+PO allocation, and a non-constructive proof of existence of allocations that are both EF1 and fractionally Pareto-optimal (fPO). We present a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute an EF1 +fPO allocation, thereby improving the earlier results. Our techniques also enable us to show that an EQ1+fPO allocation always exists when the values are positive, and that it can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time. We also consider the class of k-ary instances where k is a constant, i.e., each agent has at most k different values for the goods. We show that for such instances an EF1+fP0 allocation can be computed in polynomial time. When all values are positive, we show that an EQ1+fP0 allocation for such instances can be computed in polynomial time. Next, we consider instances where the number of agents is constant, and show that an EF1+PO (also EQ1+PO) allocation can be computed in polynomial time. These results significantly extend the polynomial-time computability beyond the known cases of binary or identical valuations. Further, we show that the problem of computing an EF1+PO allocation polynomial-time reduces to a problem in the complexity class PLS. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that computes Nash welfare maximizing allocations when there are constantly many agents with constant many different values for the goods.