Externalities and bargaining disagreement

被引：4
|
作者：
Chowdhury, PR [1 ]
机构：
[1] Indian Inst Management, Calcutta 700027, W Bengal, India
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 61卷 / 01期
关键词：
bargaining disagreements; externalities;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00148-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine the possibility of disagreement in a one period bargaining model with positive externalities. We find that when the externalities are relatively small no such disagreements can arise, i.e., there are no ex post bargaining inefficiencies. If, however, the externalities are large enough then disagreements occur with a positive probability. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：61 / 65
页数：5
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