Zalabardo on the Distinction Between Inferential and Non-Inferential Knowledge

被引:0
|
作者
Angel Fernandez, Miguel [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nacl Autonoma Mexico, Inst Invest Filosof, Mexico City 04510, DF, Mexico
来源
TEOREMA | 2014年 / 33卷 / 03期
关键词
Inferential Knowledge; Non-Inferential Knowledge; Truth-Tracking; Evidence;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper examines the distinction between inferential (IK) and non-inferential knowledge (NIK) that Jose Zalabardo puts forward in his recent book Scepticism and Reliable Belief. The paper argues that the distinction he draws is not satisfactory because (i) instead of capturing a fundamental difference between NIK and IK, it actually entails that both types of knowledge work in fundamentally the same way, and (ii) it permits distorting reconstructions of many cases of NIK as cases of IK.
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页码:139 / 148
页数:10
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