A government perspective on New Zealand's experience with ITQs

New Zealand has introduced a range of fisheries into individual transferable quota (ITQ) management since 1982 when explicit mechanisms to introduce transferable property rights were first used in New Zealand's deep-water fisheries. Pre-dating this, there were individual quota arrangements in the Bluff oyster fishery and the Ellesmere eel fishery. A comprehensive regime for quota management and individual transferable quota was introduced into New Zealand fisheries law in 1986. This paper explores the mechanisms that were used to encourage fishers to accept the implementation of an ITQ management regime. The incentives principally were a buy-out mechanism, a quota appeal authority regime to review quotas of individuals, and a mechanism whereby government bought quota on catch reduction and sold quota on catch increases. The paper further proceeds to examine the incentives that have developed for fisheries conservation and for efficient fisheries economic use in the years since 1986. Discussion focuses on a range of issues. These include the development of claims for aboriginal title, the outcome of the various litigation and government negotiations on this issue, the need for further structural reform in the quota management system, and warnings to those who are proceeding to implement similar systems to ensure that policies are clear on the role of government and the role of industry in the management regimes that are established. The paper advises that the return, if any, to the Crown or governing body should be determined prior to establishing the management regime, and equally clear rules and policy should be established before introducing quota regimes with regard to the costs to industry and government.