PAUL FEYERABEND'S CRITIQUE OF THE NEO-POSITIVIST MODEL OF MEANING

Paul Feyerabend's critique of the neo-positivist model of meaning and his subsequent abandonment of language-related issues, among other turns of his thought, has given material to his critics and specialists by giving a fragmented view of his intellectual evolution. His pragmatic theory of observation has been explained in the framework of his positivist training or as an extension of his grounding in Popper's thought, but not as a continuum with the later development of this thought. This article seeks to show how this change in his interests is not only logical but forms a continuum with his subsequent critiques. When his theory of meaning is interpreted as a critique of the limits of the axiomatic model of science we can understood that this represented for him the opportunity to undertake a critical review of scientific rationality. However once Feyerabend demonstrates by his pragmatic theory of observation the absurdity of erecting an axiomatic model of science through the semantic theory of observation, the theories of meaning cease to make sense to him. Hence his initial concern for matters of meaning is dismissed by Feyerabend as useless for a theory of knowledge and science.