Underwriter-Auditor Relationship and Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China

被引:20
|
作者
Du, Xingqiang [1 ]
Li, Xu [2 ]
Liu, Xuejiao [3 ]
Lai, Shaojuan [4 ]
机构
[1] Xiamen Univ, Dept Accounting, Sch Management, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[4] Xiamen Natl Accounting Inst, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Underwriter-auditor relationship (UAR); Earnings management; The collusion incentive; Political connections; Underwriter (auditor) reputation; Legal environment; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; QUALITY; FIRM; CHOICE; PERFORMANCE; REPUTATION; CLIENT; LITIGATION;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-016-3278-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the influence of underwriter-auditor relationship (UAR) on pre-initial public offering (IPO) earnings management. Using a sample of Chinese to-be-listed firms, we find that a close UAR, as reflected in repeated collaborations between an underwriter and an audit firm in IPOs, is positively associated with pre-IPO earnings management. This association is more pronounced for firms with politically connected auditors/underwriters, firms with less reputable auditors/underwriters, firms located in provinces with weak legal environment, firms to-be-listed on boards with lax listing requirements, and firms whose auditors are with low industry specialization, and legal liability exposures. We provide further evidence that UAR is associated with greater likelihood of irregular activities in post-IPO period and poorer post-IPO financial performance. To the extent that we control for alternative explanations and potential endogeneity, our results suggest that the collusion incentive is likely to drive repeated collaborations between underwriters and auditors in the Chinese IPO market. Our findings provide interesting implications for auditors, investors, and regulators seeking to understand the Chinese IPO market.
引用
收藏
页码:365 / 392
页数:28
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Underwriter–Auditor Relationship and Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China
    Xingqiang Du
    Xu Li
    Xuejiao Liu
    Shaojuan Lai
    [J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2018, 152 : 365 - 392
  • [2] Underwriter Reputation, Issuer Ownership, and Pre-IPO Earnings Management: Evidence from China
    Chen, Chao
    Shi, Haina
    Xu, Haoping
    [J]. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2013, 42 (03) : 647 - 677
  • [3] Pre-IPO earnings management: Evidence from India
    Nikbakht, Ehsan
    Sarkar, Sayan
    Smith, Garrett C.
    Spieler, Andrew C.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AUDITING AND TAXATION, 2021, 44
  • [4] Underwriter Discourse, IPO Profit Distribution, and Audit Quality: An Entropy Study from the Perspective of an Underwriter-Auditor Network
    Yang, Songling
    Tai, Yafei
    Cao, Yu
    Chen, Yunzhu
    Zhang, Qiuyue
    [J]. ENTROPY, 2024, 26 (05)
  • [5] The pre-IPO dividend and IPO underpricing: Evidence from China
    Wang, Jiaxin
    Cheng, Ruonan
    Huang, Yong
    Yan, Chao
    [J]. PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 82
  • [6] The economic profitability of pre-IPO earnings management and IPO underperformance
    Xiong Y.
    Zhou H.
    Varshney S.
    [J]. Journal of Economics and Finance, 2010, 34 (3) : 229 - 256
  • [7] Response of anchor investors to pre-IPO earnings management: evidence from an emerging market
    Narang, Sahil
    Pradhan, Rudra P.
    [J]. MANAGERIAL FINANCE, 2024, 50 (05) : 920 - 943
  • [8] Earnings management in the pre-IPO process: Biases and predictors
    Premti, Arjan
    Smith, Garrett
    [J]. RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCE, 2020, 52
  • [9] Does CEO-Auditor Dialect Sharing Impair Pre-IPO Audit Quality? Evidence from China
    Xingqiang Du
    [J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2019, 156 : 699 - 735
  • [10] Does CEO-Auditor Dialect Sharing Impair Pre-IPO Audit Quality? Evidence from China
    Du, Xingqiang
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 2019, 156 (03) : 699 - 735