Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Relativity of Truth and Meaning

This paper considers the challenge to understanding another that comes from the view that language is, in Cristina Lafont's phrase, 'world-disclosing'. If different speakers understand and refer to the world from different holistically structured worldviews, it seems to follow that there can be no mutual understanding unless there is significant overlap between 'worlds'. Gadamer's hermeneutics, I claim, blocks this consequence while maintaining that language is indeed world-disclosing. By holding that language is a medium in which the distinction between interpretation and object of interpretation is paradoxically both maintained and overcome, Gadamer shows us that the interpreter always thinks the object of interpretation as both transcending and immanent in her worldview. Mutual understanding becomes a matter of mutual recognition of such worldview-(but not language-) transcendent objects. Truth and meaning may on this view be characterized as 'objective', while retaining a significant element of relativity.