The supply chain incentive contract under double moral-hazard

被引：0
|
作者：
Li, Shanliang [1 ]
Wang, Chunhua [1 ]
机构：
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS, VOLS 1-10 | 2007年
关键词：
supply chain; double moral hazard; principal-agent theory; Stackelberg game; asymmetric information;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper, by the principal-agent theory, we study the game between the supplier and retailer under asymmetric information. We design the supply chain incentive contract in the double moral-hazard situation in which the supplier (as the principal) also affects the sales. In fact, the model is constructed as a Stackelberg game which solution is the optimal policy of the supplier. As a benchmark, we first get the solution of the case of the complete information. Then we compare the policy with the case of the asymmetric information and study the characteristics of the optimal contract.
引用
收藏
页码：1177 / 1181
页数：5
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