One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

被引：9
|
作者：
Nakamura, Tomoya [1 ]
机构：
[1] Osaka Univ, ISER, Osaka 5670047, Japan
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 127卷
关键词：
Stackelberg competition; Cournot competition; First and second mover advantages; Public and private information; MOVER DISADVANTAGES; SOCIAL VALUE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：27 / 30
页数：4
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