Simultaneous Decisions or Leadership in an International Competition

被引：2
|
作者：
Ferreira, Fernando A. [1 ]
Ferreira, Flavio [1 ]
机构：
[1] CMUP, Porot Polytech Inst, Rua D Sancho 1,981, P-4480876 Vila Do Conde, Portugal
来源：
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLIED MATHEMATICS, VOLS I-III | 2010年 / 1281卷
关键词：
Industrial Organization; Game Theory; uncertainty; Cournot model; leadership; WELFARE; TARIFFS;
D O I：
10.1063/1.3498607
中图分类号：
T [工业技术];
学科分类号：
08 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.
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页码：804 / +
页数：2
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