Pro-social motivation, effort and the call to public service

被引:47
|
作者
Banuri, Sheheryar [1 ,2 ]
Keefer, Philip [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[2] Univ E Anglia, Ctr Behav & Expt Social Sci, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
[3] Interamer Dev Bank, 1300 New York Ave, Washington, DC 20577 USA
关键词
Public sector reform; Civil service; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Performance; INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION; INCENTIVES; SECTOR; IMAGE; RISK; PHILANTHROPY; ORGANIZATION; EMPLOYEES; ALTRUISM; MISSIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.10.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the interaction of pro-social motivation and wages in pro-social organizations with a novel subject pool, 1700 students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia, using a measure of pro-social motivation that exactly matches"the mission of the organization. Three novel conclusions emerge. Consistent with a common, but untested, assumption in the theoretical literature, workers with greater pro-social motivation exert higher real effort. However, high pay attracts less pro-socially motivated individuals. Furthermore, we also test whether a real world pro-social organization (the Indonesian Ministry of Finance) attracts pro-socially motivated workers. We find that prospective entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance exhibit higher levels of pro-social motivation than a comparable sample of general workers. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
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页码:139 / 164
页数:26
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