Production externalities, congruity of aggregate signals, and optimal task assignments

被引：0
|
作者：
Hughes, JS [1 ]
Zhang, L
Xie, JZJ
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2005年 / 22卷 / 02期
关键词：
complementarities; congruity; effort allocations; incentives; repetition; task assignments;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we consider the role of production externalities in the task assignment problem. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that complementarities available when agents are assigned to diverse tasks are necessary to overcome distortions in effort allocations caused by an inability to fine-tune incentives when agents' compensation is based on aggregate imperfect signals. Our analysis formalizes this intuition in a setting that encompasses externalities under both diverse and similar task assignments.
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页码：393 / 408
页数：16
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