Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random

被引：6
|
作者：
Smorodinsky, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2005年 / 50卷 / 01期
关键词：
bargaining; Nash solution; random disagreement point;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.02.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In his seminal work, Nash (1950) [Nash, J.F. (1950). "The Bargaining Problem", Econometrica, 18, 155-162.] derives a solution for two-person bargaining problems, within a cooperative setup. Nash assumes that the result of disagreement is known to both players and is not stochastic. We study the same problem, where the last assumption is relaxed. We provide a set of axioms which characterizes a natural generalization of the Nash solution to bargaining problems with a random point of disagreement. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：3 / 11
页数：9
相关论文
共 50 条
12345