An Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for Energy Storage Markets

被引:3
|
作者
Satchidanandan, Bharadwaj [1 ]
Dahleh, Munther A. [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Lab Informat & Decis Syst, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
Costs; ISO; Batteries; Generators; Real-time systems; Schedules; Uncertainty; Energy storage markest; electric vehicles; stochastic valuations; incentive compatible mechanism;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2022.3145689
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
A key obstacle to increasing renewable energy penetration in the power grid is the lack of utility-scale storage capacity. Transportation electrification has the potential to overcome this obstacle since Electric Vehicles (EVs) that are not in transit can provide battery storage as a service to the grid. This is referred to as EV-Power grid integration, and could potentially be a key milestone in the pathway to decarbonize the electricity and the transportation sectors. We first show that if EV-Power grid integration is not done carefully, then contrary to improving the cost efficiency of operating the grid, it could in fact be counterproductive to it. This occurs due to two phenomena operating in tandem - the randomness of EV usage patterns and the possibility of strategic behavior by EV users. We present a market-based solution to address this issue. Specifically, we develop a mechanism for energy storage markets using which the system operator can efficiently integrate a fleet of strategic EVs with random usage patterns into the grid, utilize them for storage, and satisfy the demand at the minimum possible cost.
引用
收藏
页码:2245 / 2258
页数:14
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