Incentive contracts under imperfect auditing

被引：3

作者：

Chen, Hsiao-Chi ^{[1
]}

Liu, Shi-Miin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Taipei Univ, Taipei, Taiwan

来源：

MANCHESTER SCHOOL | 2008年 / 76卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01053.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we analyze the optimal incentive contracts under imperfect auditing. Both principal's commitment and no commitment to auditing cases are investigated. In the commitment case, the Baron-Besanko-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 447-470) contract would fail under imperfect auditing. In the no-commitment case, the Baron-Myerson (Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 911-930) and the Khalil-type (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (1997), pp. 629-640) contracts could survive under specific misjudging probabilities. In addition, there exists a separate equilibrium with the agent's full compliance and the principal's sure ex post auditing.

引用

页码：131 / 159

页数：29

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