On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information

被引:0
|
作者
Poudou, Jean-Christophe [2 ]
Thomas, Lionel [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Franche Comte, Dept GEA, CRESE, IUT Besancon, F-25030 Besancon, France
[2] Univ Montpellier 1, Montpellier, France
关键词
Industrial regulation; R&D; Incentives; FIRM;
D O I
10.1007/s10058-009-0081-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper deals with the optimal regulation for cost-reducing R&D and pricing in natural monopoly that is privately informed on its efficiency. We extend the work of Cantner and Kuhn (Rev Econ Des 4:191-204, 1999) and then we are able to analyse the entire effects of the interplay between agent's efficiency and investment in R&D particularly considering the substitutability case.
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页码:251 / 269
页数:19
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