Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers: An applied principal-agent analysis

First the empirical background of the U.K. venture capital industry is developed using a panel of major U.K. venture capital funds over the period 1988-92. Then a framework for applied principal agent analysis is developed, focusing on risk management and information. Under risk management it explores attitude to risk, risk sharing and bearing, and the effects of risk bearing on effort. Under information handling, it explores information systems, information asymmetries between investor (venture capitalist) and investee (entrepreneur), and ways of attenuating them, and information variance and costs. Finally, the contract between investor and investee is seen as a device for ''trading'' risk and information. The implications of this ''trading'' for risk bearing, effort and efficiency are explored. The whole analysis is supported by a detailed case study which reflects current practice in the U.K. venture capital industry. The evidence provides striking confirmation of the applicability of the principal-agent model to the venture capital financing of high-tech ventures.