Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part

被引:4
|
作者
Busetto, Francesca [1 ]
Codognato, Giulio [1 ,2 ]
Ghosal, Sayantan [3 ]
Julien, Ludovic [2 ]
Tonin, Simone [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Udine, Dipartimento Sci Econ & Stat, I-33100 Udine, Italy
[2] Univ Paris Nanterre, CNRS, Economix, UPL, F-92000 Nanterre, France
[3] Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Lanark, Scotland
关键词
Bilateral oligopoly; Cournot-Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality; NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA; STRATEGIC MARKET GAMES; NONCOOPERATIVE OLIGOPOLY; TRADING ECONOMY; CONTINUUM; INEFFICIENCY; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467-501, 1973), that a Cournot-Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.
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收藏
页码:933 / 951
页数:19
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