Popular Matchings in the Stable Marriage Problem

被引:0
|
作者
Huang, Chien-Chung [1 ]
Kavitha, Telikepalli [2 ]
机构
[1] Humboldt Univ, Berlin, Germany
[2] Tata Inst Fundamental Res, Bombay, Maharashtra, India
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The input is a bipartite graph G = (A boolean OR B, E) where each vertex u is an element of A boolean OR B ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M* is said to be popular if there is no matching M such that more vertices are better off in M than in M*. We consider the problem of computing a maximum cardinality popular matching in G. It is known that popular matchings always exist in such an instance G, however the complexity of computing a maximum cardinality popular matching was not known so far. In this paper we give a simple characterization of popular matchings when preference lists are strict and a sufficient condition for a maximum cardinality popular matching. We then show an O(mn(0)) algorithm for computing a maximum cardinality popular matching in G, where m = vertical bar E vertical bar and n(0) = min(vertical bar A vertical bar, vertical bar B).
引用
收藏
页码:666 / 677
页数:12
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