Hans Kelsen's and Robert Alexy's Application Theories: Continuity or Disruption?

被引:0
|
作者
Trivisonno, Alexandre Travessoni Gomes [1 ,2 ]
De Oliveira, Julio Aguiar [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Fed Univ Ouro Preto UFOP, Legal Theory & Legal Philosophy, Ave 31 Marco,1010 Predio 93, BR-30535000 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil
[2] Pontif Catholic Univ Minas Gerais PUC Minas, Programa Posgrad Direito PUC Minas, Ave 31 Marco,1020 Predio 93, BR-30535000 Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil
来源
关键词
Hans Kelsen; Robert Alexy; application theories; discretion; continuity; disruption;
D O I
10.25162/arsp-2021-0031
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This article explores the common points and the differences between Hans Kelsen's and Robert Alexy's application theories. Although Kelsen subscribed to moral relativism and denied the idea of a practical reason, while Alexy criticised moral relativism and defended the idea of a communicative reason, it is argued that the two theories share important common features, such as denying that interpretation can point one single answer as the right one and acknowledging that interpretation is comprised by both knowledge and will. The article acknowledges that there are differences between both theories, analyses whether these differences are qualitative or quantitative and, in the end, concludes that between the two theories there is not disruption, as one might believe, but rather continuity.
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页码:599 / 615
页数:17
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