The Labor-Managed Firm: Permanent or Start-Up Subsidies?

被引:3
|
作者
Groot, Loek [1 ]
van der Linde, Daan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utrecht, Sch Econ USE, Publ Sect, Econ, Utrecht, Netherlands
关键词
cooperatives; ESOP; game theory; labor-managed firm; profit sharing; WORKER PARTICIPATION; PRODUCTIVITY; OWNERSHIP; WAGES;
D O I
10.1080/00213624.2017.1391592
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore a new argument that seeks to explain the near absence of the labor-managed firm or cooperative, despite a range of inefficiencies attributed to the present-day capitalist firm. We derive the crucial condition for the emergence of labor-managed firms and show that it is unduly restrictive from an efficiency point of view. The policy implication is that public intervention to promote labor-managed firms should primarily be in the form of start-up subsidies rather than in providing permanent tax subsidies.
引用
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页码:1074 / 1093
页数:20
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