The destruction of metaphysics - Levinas against Heidegger

被引:0
|
作者
Klun, Branko [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ljubljana, Ljubljana 61000, Slovenia
关键词
D O I
10.7761/SP.6.155
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Although Levinas' "il y a" does not directly correspond to Heidegger's conception of being, his criticism of Heidegger's temporal ontology is nevertheless Justified. With the reduction of every meaning (and being) to its temporal constitution, Heidegger excludes any possibility of transcendence beyond time. The problem of overcoming the radical finitude and historicity of meaning, which is ethically motivated, brings Levinas to the age-old question of metaphysics. However, taking Heidegger's thought seriously, Levinas is forced to look for an entirely new understanding of the metaphysical quest.
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页码:155 / 170
页数:16
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